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BREXIT AND ARTICLE 50 TEU:A CONSTITUTIONALIST READING
PIET EECKHOUT AND ELENI FRANTZIOU*
Abstract
This article considers the constitutional requirements and implications of
Article 50 TEU for the EU. It argues that it is essential to read Article 50
in light of the features of the Treaty of which it forms part together with its
drafting context, that of the Convention on the Future of Europe, as well as
the substantive protections of EU constitutional law. The article
demonstrates that important constitutional constraints are in place in EU
law, which can affect the most significant debates in the withdrawal
process, namely: the manner in which notification to withdraw from the
Union is given; the revocability of a decision to withdraw; and the legal
basis and content of the withdrawal agreement. Most importantly, a
reading of Article 50 informed by key constitutional features of the EU
legal order stipulates clear duties for the EU to respect the UK’s
constitutional requirements and to protect, in any eventual agreement,
acquired rights for EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, by
emphasizing the illegality of a non-compliant withdrawal agreement from
the EU perspective.
1. Introduction
Never before has a provision of EU law become so well known in such a short
space of time as Article 50 TEU. In a seismic vote on 23 June 2016, the British
people decided with a clear but by no means overwhelming majority that the
United Kingdom (UK) should leave the EU. The UK Government and
Parliament have now decided to give effect to that vote by formally notifying
the EU of the UK’s intention to withdraw in a letter delivered to the President
of the European Council on 29 March 2017.1
* Respectively Faculty of Laws, UCL and Westminster Law School. The authors are
grateful for comments on an earlier draft by Paul Craig, Federico Ortino, Thomas Streinz, and
UCL Laws faculty, and for the support of the UCL European Institute.
1. See European Council Press Releases and Statements, “Statement by the European
Council (Art. 50) on the UK notification”, No. 159/17, 29 Mar 2017, <www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/29-euco-50-statement-uk-notification/> (last
visited 3 Apr. 2017).
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Article 50 TEU itself is a sparsely worded provision, which raises more
questions than it answers, and which is of course wholly untested.2 Now that
the withdrawal process has formally commenced, it is clear that in addition to
any concerns it may raise from the viewpoint of national law,3 it will be
governed by the law of the EU in a number of ways. This article advocates and
articulates a constitutionalist interpretation of Article 50 TEU. Our
overarching argument is that withdrawal requires compliance with EU
constitutional law, which comprises respect for national constitutional
requirements as well as key EU values, such as democracy, the rule of law, the
protection of fundamental rights including non-discrimination on grounds of
nationality, and EU citizenship.
A constitutionalist reading has significant implications for the nature and
conduct of the negotiations, but also – should an agreement be reached – for
the content of the withdrawal agreement and the shape of the future
relationship between the UK and the Union. This article demonstrates the
need for considered assessment of these commitments on both sides of the
Channel – and not just negotiation through intergovernmental bargaining. A
constitutionalist reading of Article 50 also builds on recent appeals for a
“kinder, gentler Brexit”.4 It illustrates that a non-punishing approach towards
withdrawal is not merely a question of the Union’s charitable disposition but
that it is, rather, mandated by the Union’s obligation to respect constitutional
requirements of a withdrawing State, the rights of individuals, and its own
very values.
Indeed, there is no denying that the withdrawal of one of its largest Member
States is a moment of crisis for the Union and a difficult test for the
effectiveness of its institutions. A return to functional intergovernmentalism
without sincere, explicit, and consistent regard for the constitutional
commitments made in the Treaties would deeply undermine the idea that the
EU is built not just upon mutual interests, but also the rule of law. By contrast,
a constitutionalist approach towards the negotiations is an opportunity to
affirm that the structures built over the last sixty years have truly come to
constitute a new mode of post-State organization, premised on cooperation,
genuine respect for common values and fundamental rights, and a
2. On the difference with prior withdrawals, see Tatham, “Don’t mention divorce at the
wedding, darling!: EU accession and withdrawal after Lisbon” in Eeckhout, Biondi, and Ripley
(Eds.), EU Law After Lisbon (OUP, 2012), p. 148.
3. R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768
(Admin) (“Miller Divisional Court”); R (on the application of Miller and another)
(Respondents) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC
5 (“Miller Supreme Court”).
4. Weiler, “Editorial: The case for a kinder, gentler Brexit”, 15 I-CON (2017).
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supranational citizenship, which could see the Union through a new era
following the UK’s withdrawal.5 In other words, a constitutionalist reading of
Article 50 is the only possible reading of the provision that enables the EU to
preserve its sui generis character as a new legal order that creates rights and
obligations for its subjects, and remains a significant part of their legal
heritage.6
The article is structured as follows. First, we further articulate why a
constitutionalist reading of Article 50 is essential by drawing support both
from the drafting context in which the provision was inserted into the treaties
and the very nature of the withdrawal process (section 2). We then discuss in
more detail what the drafting context of this provision reveals about the
political intentions that shaped it (section 3), before going on to apply these
findings to the different aspects of Article 50 itself. We address, in particular,
the necessity of withdrawal in accordance with UK constitutional law and the
need for the EU to respect this; the nature and timeframe of the negotiations
and agreement; and the rights of individuals and national and supranational
parliaments in the process (section 4).
2. The need for a constitutionalist reading
From the perspective of EU law, it is clear that Article 50 TEU is situated in a
quintessentially constitutional place: as the Court famously put it in Les Verts,
the Treaties are the Union’s “constitutional charter”.7 Still, as Dieter Grimm
has argued, EU law suffers from a problem of over-constitutionalization,8
insofar as it labels “constitutional” provisions that do not fulfil the functions
of constitutional law, namely to safeguard the proper process of government.9
It must therefore be emphasized that the argument for a constitutionalist
reading of Article 50 does not stem from a mere reference to the ECJ’s case
law. The need for such a reading becomes evident as soon as the provision is
considered in the light of the historical context of its drafting and the nature of
withdrawal from the Union, more broadly.
5. See further Fabbrini, “How Brexit opens a window of opportunity for Treaty reform in
the EU”, (2016) Delors Institut/Bertelsmann Stiftung: Spotlight Europe, <www.delorsinstitut.
de/2015/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/spotlight_europe_01_2016.pdf> (last visited 29 Mar.
2017).
6. Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
EU:C:1963:1.
7. Case C-294/83, Parti Ecologiste “Les Verts” v. Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para 23.
8. Grimm, “The democratic costs of constitutionalisation: The European case”, 21 ELJ
(2015), 469–471.
9. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP, 2003), pp. 5–7.
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As Kostakopoulou has put it, withdrawal is “anchored” in the constitutional
character of the Union as a freely associative, rather than coercive, project.10
Whereas it was the Lisbon Treaty that ultimately brought it within EU law, the
right of voluntary withdrawal was negotiated within the Convention on the
Future of Europe, and formed part of the Constitutional Treaty.11 The
Constitution’s withdrawal clause was adopted without any fundamental
changes by the Lisbon Intergovernmental Conference, becoming Article 50
TEU.12 This historical context constitutes a first, immediate reason for a
constitutionalist reading. The fact that Article 50 enters the EU legal order at
this constitutional moment is significant. It coincides with the point at which
the Union attempted to draw up a framework of governance that fulfilled
aspirations of further political integration and was premised on common
values, a binding Charter of Fundamental Rights, and a commitment to the
principles of democracy and the rule of law. In this sense, Article 50 has an
“inherently specific” constitutional context, which sheds light on its
interpretation.13
Indeed, Article 50 is of a constitutional character not only in formal but also
in substantive terms. To paraphrase Bruce Ackerman: when considering what
the constitution of the EU actually constitutes,14 it would be impossible not to
make reference to membership of and distancing from that Union, i.e. who
takes part therein and who does not. One can hardly imagine provisions that
are more “constitutional” in character than those concerning the make-up,
objectives, membership, and withdrawal from the EU. In regulating the latter
process,Article 50 is directly constitutive of what the EU is.The interpretation
of Article 50 affects the Union’s very identity as a constitutional order
committed to the values of “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to minorities”.15 To adopt any interpretation thereof other
10. Kostakopoulou, “Brexit, voice and loyalty: Reflections on Article 50 TEU”, 41 EL Rev.
(2016), 488.
11. The right of voluntary withdrawal from the Union was initially envisaged as Art. 46 in
Ch. X of the first part of the Constitution entitled “Membership of the Union”. It was
renumbered Art. 59 in the Constitution’s final draft.
12. The Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 21–22 June 2007, in
which the main reforms to the Constitutional Treaty are discussed mention the withdrawal
clause only in passing: see Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, 20 July 2007,
11177/1/07 REV 1, para 16.
13. Dowdle and Wilkinson, “On the limits of constitutional liberalism: In search of a
constitutional reflexivity”, (2015) NUS Law Working Paper, 6–7.
14. Ackerman, “The Storrs lectures: Discovering the constitution”, 93 Yale Law Journal
(1984), 1040.
15. Art. 2 TEU.
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than a constitutionalist one would amount to an implicit refutation of that
identity – one that distinguishes the Union from other international
organizations.16
The need for a constitutionalist reading is confirmed by the fact that Article
50 does not operate in a vacuum. It regulates withdrawal from a series of
specific protections guaranteed by EU law over several decades, so that its
terms must be assessed in light of the spirit of the TEU and the Union’s most
basic commitments. It is indeed obvious that a national decision such as Brexit
and the process of withdrawal that it triggers raise concerns about the
safeguarding of the values mentioned above.17 For example, extricating the
UK from the acquis communautaire is a complex, wide-ranging and intrusive
legal exercise, which raises questions of respect for constitutional guarantees
relating to acquired rights and the rule of law. One need look only at the debate
about safeguarding current rights to work and rights of residence of EU
citizens in the UK, or instead using them as a “bargaining chip” in the Brexit
negotiations.18
The degree to which the rights of citizens are at stake in the Article 50
process puts the need for a constitutionalist reading most sharply into focus.
These rights are not confined to human rights. The direct effect of EU law, be
it in the form of provisions in the Treaties or EU legislation, is an enormous
rights-generating factory, as the Court of Justice famously found in Van Gend
en Loos.19 Often, EU law creates directly effective rights and duties,
enforceable in national law, without even using a rights vocabulary. Rights
may simply be created through the imposition of obligations, on the EU
institutions,20 the Member States,21 or private actors.22 Take a principle as
fundamental as the free movement of goods.The relevant TFEU provisions do
not, in their terms, confer any rights to free trade on private parties; they
16. Case C-26/72, Van Gend en Loos.
17. See Letsas, “The Constitution and the folly of majoritarianism”, UK Constitutional
Law Blog, 20 Feb. 2017, <www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/20/george-letsas-the-constitu
tion-and-the-folly-of-majoritarianism/> (last visited 10 Mar. 2017).
18. See Mantouvalou, “EU citizens as bargaining chips”, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 14
July 2016, <www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/14/virginia-mantouvalou-eu-citizens-as-
bargaining-chips/>
(last visited 10 Dec. 2016).
19. Case C-26/72, Van Gend en Loos.
20. Perhaps most illustratively, see the creation of rights in theKadi litigation: Joined Cases
C-402 & 415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission, EU:C:2008:461; Joined
Cases C-584, 593, & 595/10 P, Commission and Others v. Kadi, EU:C:2013:518.
21. Case C-26/72, Van Gend en Loos.
22. Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch, EU:C:1974:140; Case C-415/93, Bosman,
EU:C:1995:463; Case C-43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, EU:C:1976:56.
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impose obligations on the Member States. But the direct effect and primacy of
these provisions mean that both individuals and companies have an
enforceable right to “free cross-border trade” which trumps any inconsistent
national law.23
This system of rights is not a theoretical construct. It is part and parcel of the
daily lives of millions of people, both in the UK and elsewhere in the EU.
Indeed, the rights that EU law generates are beyond enumeration, or even
classification. They are scattered throughout all EU policies and thousands of
pieces of legislation.24 What follows is definitely incomplete and strictly
illustrative.There are rights to free trade, in goods and services;25 rights to free
movement of capital and free establishment;26 rights to free movement of
persons, accompanied by rights to work, to reside, not to be discriminated
against on grounds of nationality.27 There are broader rights to equality;28
political rights;29 employment and social rights;30 consumer rights;31
environmental rights;32 rights to agricultural subsidies;33 rights to have
foreign judgments enforced;34 rights of immigration and family
reunification;35 rights to privacy and data protection.36 Overarching all of
23. See Case C-8/74,Dassonville, EU:C:1974:82; Case C-171/11,Fra.bo, EU:C:2012:453.
24. Andrew Duff notes that over 1200 regulations and directives currently apply to the UK:
Duff, “After Brexit: A new Association Agreement between Britain and Europe”, Policy
Network Paper, Oct. 2016, <www.policy-network.net/publications_download.aspx?ID=9435>
(last visited 11 Dec. 2016), 8.
25. Arts. 34 and 56 TFEU respectively.
26. Arts. 56 and 49 TFEU respectively.
27. Arts. 45, 21, 18 TFEU; Regulation (EU) 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 5 Apr. 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, O.J. 2011,
L 141/1.
28. Arts. 21–26 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. 2012, C 326/02
(EUCFR); Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation, O.J. 2000, L 303/16.
29. Arts. 20 and 22 TFEU.
30. Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, O.J. 1989, C 120/52;
Arts. 27 et seq. EUCFR.
31. Art. 12 TFEU; Art. 38 EUCFR.
32. Art. 191 TFEU; Art. 37 EUCFR.
33. Art. 171 TFEU.
34. Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. 2011, L 12/1 (“Brussels
Regulation”).
35. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 Apr. 2004
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States, O.J. 2004, L 229/35.
36. Arts. 7–8 EUCFR; Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 Oct. 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, O.J. 1995, L 281/31.
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these rights is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which proclaims a
number of them to be fundamental and ensures their respect within the scope
of application of EU law.37
Brexit does not mean that all these rights will be lost. The UK Government
proposes to put a Great Repeal Bill before Parliament which, contrary to its
title, would keep most EU law on the statute book as a post-Brexit
starting-point.38 However, some rights will inevitably be lost, as the Miller
litigation established, for example the right to vote for the European
Parliament, and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European
Parliament.39 Other rights are contingent on how the future relationship is
constructed. That relationship can never keep all rights resulting from full
membership intact, or else Brexit would make no sense. Given the UK’s
dualist system, the rights that do survive will be rights under international law.
They may be incorporated into domestic law, but will no longer benefit from
the direct effect and primacy of EU law.40
Moreover, in light of the uncertainty inherent in the political nature of the
withdrawal process, which is one of negotiation, many EU law rights are
rendered vulnerable. This is the case for those rights which cannot be
maintained in the absence of their recognition by all Member States, for
example rights of free movement, including those of UK citizens to work and
reside in other Member States. What could also be lost is a certain level of
entrenchment of EU law rights, particularly but not exclusively those which
flow from the EU Treaties and the Charter. That is a function of the high
political threshold for obtaining any amendment, let alone termination of such
rights: all Member States have to agree, in accordance with their constitutional
requirements.41 Even rights which merely result from EU secondary
37. Art. 51 EUCFR; Art. 6 TEU.
38. Department for Exiting the European Union White Paper, “Legislating for the United
Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union”, Cm. 9446, Mar. 2017, <www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604516/Great_repeal_bill_white_
paper_accessible.pdf> (last visited 3 Apr. 2017); see also Douglas-Scott, “The ‘Great Repeal
Bill’: Constitutional chaos and constitutional crisis?”, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 10 Oct.
2016, <www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/10/10/sionaidh-douglas-scott-the-great-repeal-bi
ll-constitutional-chaos-and-constitutional-crisis/> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016); Simpson-Caird,
“Legislating for Brexit: The Great Repeal Bill”,House of Commons Library Briefing PaperNo.
7793, 23 Feb. 2017, <www.researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7793/
CBP-7793.pdf> (last visited 9 Mar. 2017).
39. Miller Divisional Court, para 61;Miller Supreme Court, paras. 69–72.
40. For a detailed analysis of the legal effects of withdrawal on different types of EU law
rights in the UK, see Łazowski, “EU withdrawal: Good business for British business?”, 21 EPL
(2016), 121–126.
41. Art. 48 TEU.
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legislation may be more difficult to amend than rights conferred by domestic
legislation.42
This entrenchment has a strong counter-majoritarian streak. For example,
even if many EU citizens who have benefited from free movement may be
regarded as part of globalization’s elites, they do constitute a minority in
fundamental rights terms. The Brexit referendum campaign, vote, and
subsequent developments pose a threat to their rights in a variety of ways,
which we consider in further detail in following sections. The impact of
withdrawal on rights, particularly of those people living in the UK, but also of
UK citizens in other Member States, commands an understanding of Article
50 that takes into account the role of rights in the EU legal order. The conferral
of rights is a central feature of the EU’s “constitution” and its construction
over the years.43 It has in turn been a key aspect of membership of the Union.
What does a constitutionalist reading entail then? The answer to that
question follows in part below, when we explore some of the key questions
and issues thatArticle 50 presents (section 4). In more general terms, however,
we agree with Streinz that the Brexit process must first of all be a cooperative
one, since the duty of cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU continues to
bind the EU institutions, the UK, and the other Member States, for as long as
Brexit is not complete.44 The guiding principle in the negotiations for a
withdrawal agreement must therefore be respect for EU constitutional law, and
the rule of law and the protection of rights are paramount in this regard. A
constitutionalist reading of Article 50 also requires respect for other EU
values, such as democracy, which points to the role of parliaments in the
process. It further needs to be consistent with the principles governing the
division of competences between the EU and its Member States, including
questions of legal basis. A constitutionalist reading also means that, when it
comes to defining the EU’s future relationship with the UK, as a non-Member
State, the negotiations need to take account of the core objectives of EU
external action. These include the promotion of the EU’s values and interests;
the protection of its citizens and of human rights; and free and fair trade.45
Our constitutionalist reading stands in contrast with a purely
intergovernmental or internationalist reading. It is also one which is not
focused on a purely textual interpretation of Article 50. That provision is an
important constitutional guide to the withdrawal process. Its authors, however,
42. McCrea, “Forward or back: The future of European integration and the impossibility of
the status quo”, 2017 ELJ, forthcoming.
43. Weiler, “The transformation of Europe”, 100 Yale Law Journal (1991), esp. 2417–19.
See also Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (OUP, 2004), p. 53.
44. Streinz, “Cooperative Brexit: Giving back control over trade policy”, (2017) I-CON,
forthcoming.
45. See Art. 3(5) TEU.
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could not have foreseen the range of issues and questions which a specific
withdrawal (Brexit) may throw up. EU constitutional principles and
provisions must fill the gaps, and may even modify what under a plain reading
seems incontrovertible – for example the firmness of the two-year deadline for
the withdrawal agreement (see section 4.3.3. below).
3. Lessons from the travaux
It is often said that Article 50 was never intended to be used,46 and that it was
hastily drafted. However, the records of the Convention on the Future of
Europe show that it was seriously considered and debated. Since theArticle 50
process is unprecedented, an adequate constitutional analysis must take
account of the information regarding the content and goals of this provision
that emerges from its drafting context. Furthermore, from a constitutional
perspective, the intentions of the drafters are significant and are likely to play
a role in the interpretation of Article 50 should it come before the ECJ. While
in the past the Court made use of a teleological methodology that did not place
emphasis on the drafters’ actual intentions, as Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons
have explained, this was largely the case because the travaux of the founding
Treaties were not available.47 As a conscious effort was made to render the
consultation and drafting process of the Constitution for Europe as open and
transparent as possible, references to the travaux are now justified and
constitutionally welcome.48 Indeed, in light of the fact that many provisions of
the Constitutional Treaty (including Art. 50) were copied into the Lisbon
Treaty, the ECJ has become more receptive to interpretations based on
preparatory documents and these are likely to play an important role in the
future.49
While there is no explanatory memorandum or official guide to Article 50,
the debate about its terms can be meaningfully reconstructed from the
proposed amendments. They do not answer all interpretative questions, but at
a minimum constitute evidence of some of the main concerns and political
intentions that surrounded the provision’s creation. The travaux highlight that
issues concerning rights, legal bases, and institutional balance were
46. O’Brien, “Article 50 was designed ‘NEVER to be used’ – says the man who wrote the
EU divorce clause”, Sunday Express, 23 July 2016, <www.express.co.uk/news/world/
692065/Article-50-NEVER-to-be-used-Europe-Brexit-Italy-Prime-Minister> (last visited 10
Dec. 2016).
47. Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, “To say what the law of the EU is: Methods of
interpretation and the European Court of Justice”, (2013) EUI Working Paper AEL
2013/09, 21.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 24.
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considered, thus making the case for a constitutionalist reading stronger. They
are also particularly useful in shedding light on the meaning of one of the most
central questions in the Brexit debate: what constitutes a Member State’s valid
decision to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional
requirements and to what extent the Article 50 process is dependent on that
decision.
The vagueness that characterizes Article 50 today was linked to the
delegates’ inability to reach agreement concerning the strictness of the
withdrawal process and, hence, on a more precise wording for the provision
itself. This can be attributed to the very different perspectives on the goals and
nature of the Constitutional Treaty. The clause was inserted in light of the fact
that the UK disagreed with the political aspiration of a closer union that the
Constitution set in motion.50 In turn, Member States that supported
the constitutionalizing project at the time, such as Germany (represented in
the negotiations by then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer), actively opposed
its insertion.51 That opposition was shared by most of the other founding
States, as well as by the EU institutions.52 Notably, a group of representatives
from the European Parliament proposed that, if the provision were
maintained, further safeguards should be added to ensure that it does not
privilege the withdrawing State.53 They argued, for example, that the article
should balance the ability to leave with a power for the Union to expel a
Member State.54 Their reasoning was that “such a parallel right of the Union to
expel Members would also reduce the risk of political blackmailing through
the means of exit threats”.55
Other important concerns raised in the course of the drafting of the
withdrawal clause were the maintenance of individual rights, the protection of
Union values, and respect for international law.56 One of the most interesting
suggestions was the introduction of an Article 50bis, which would create an
alternative form of membership of the Union for those members that wished
to remain closely linked to the EU but did not share the political ambition of
further unification, such as the UK. The proposal, made by Andrew Duff,
Lamberto Dini, Paul Helminger, Rein Lang, and Lord Maclennan, would
50. See List of proposed amendments to the text of the Articles of the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe, “Part I of the Constitution: Article 59”, 39, <european-convention.
europa.eu/docs/Treaty/pdf/46/global46.pdf> (last visited 19 Dec. 2016).
51. Ibid., 18.
52. See ibid; e.g. the Dutch, Portuguese, Luxembourgish, German, Greek, and Austrian
representatives had sought its deletion.
53. Ibid., 5.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., 7.
56. Ibid., 24, 20 and 26.
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essentially have allowed for associate (rather than full) membership of the
Union, entailing economic cooperation without an “ever closer union” in
other fields.57
A series of other amendments intended to render withdrawal more
cumbersome were proposed by Dominique de Villepin, who represented
France.58 He had suggested that withdrawal should be made conditional on a
form of “irreconcilable differences” between the withdrawing State and the
EU following a Treaty change and that it should be required that a solution be
sought within the Council first. He also asked that a limitation period be
introduced before re-accession.59 Although he only suggested a two-year
period, this seems to have been inspired by Alain Lamassoure’s vision of the
Constitutional Treaty, which had a federalist character, strictly regulating
withdrawal and including a 20-year limitation clause before re-accession.60 Of
the initial accounts of Article 50, though, most delegates seemed to favour
Robert Badinter’s proposal, which was more pragmatic.61 Still, the more
onerous clauses Badinter had proposed, such as the payment of damages to the
Union by the withdrawing State for any losses incurred through the
negotiations, were not inserted.62
It follows that Article 50(1) is the key to the withdrawal process: provided
there is a valid constitutional decision to withdraw, a Member State can notify
the European Council of its decision to do so under Article 50(2), and then
negotiate its future relationship with the Union (Art. 50(3)). This is not to say
that there are no limitations on what can be negotiated as part of a future
relationship on the part of the EU, but EU law clearly recognizes this freedom
for the withdrawing State. The withdrawal process envisaged in Article 50 is
not subject to specific conditions. It is indeed possible for a State to leave
without any agreement at all.
The fact that clauses for further limiting the provision had been proposed in
the negotiations and enjoyed some support nonetheless merits further
discussion. The text of Article 50 was in fact changed substantially from the
first63 to the final draft of the Constitution.64 While the first draft did not
57. Ibid., 8.
58. Ibid., 4.
59. Ibid.
60. European Convention, “The European Union: Four possible models”, contribution by
Mr Lamassoure, member of the Convention, 3 Sept. 2002, CONV 235/02.
61. Tatham, op. cit. supra note 2, 148.
62. European Convention, “A European Constitution”, contribution from M. Robert
Badinter, alternate member of the Convention, 30 Sept. 2002, CONV 317/02.
63. European Convention, “Document from the Praesidium: Preliminary draft
Constitutional Treaty”, 28 Oct. 2002, CONV 369/02.
64. European Convention, “Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, 18 Jul.
2003, CONV 850/03.
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contain any limitations on the withdrawing State’s re-accession to the Union,
two important provisos were added in the Constitution’s final draft: first, that
the two-year period for the negotiations could only be extended by unanimity
(Art. 59(3)); and second, that a State wishing to withdraw would need to make
a new application for accession (Art. 59(4)). This suggests that the broad
discretion allowed in respect of the unilateral withdrawal decision in the
provision’s opening paragraph was intended to be counter-balanced, first, by
conditions intended to prevent the withdrawing State holding the Union
hostage in the negotiations and, second, by the insertion of disincentives for
using Article 50. Both of these restrictions were intended to guard against the
possibility of triggering Article 50 in a politically opportunistic fashion, or by
“opponents of Europe in the Member States” – a key concern for those who
opposed its insertion.65
These aspects of the genesis of Article 50 are relevant to the contrast
between a constitutionalist and an intergovernmental or internationalist
understanding of the withdrawal process. Prior to the entry into force of
Article 50, majority opinion held that withdrawal from the EU was possible,
but only through a consensual process under Article 54 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).66 The differences between such
an interpretation and a constitutionalist reading are arguably significant. For
example, on the question whether the Article 50 process is the only
permissible Brexit route, Article 54 VCLT supplies a negative answer, as it
juxtaposes withdrawal by consent of all the parties with withdrawal in
conformity with the provisions of the treaty in issue. Article 50, by contrast,
created a unilateral right, particularly because of the two-year cut-off to the
attempt to achieve a negotiated withdrawal. It must indeed be emphasized that
withdrawal under Article 50 is an “unfettered” right for the withdrawing
State:67 it imposes neither an obligation to reach agreement nor, even, an
obligation to negotiate. If the withdrawing State chose to leave the Union
without doing either, it could do so, and would be considered withdrawn two
years after notification.
The EU constitution therefore protects the right of withdrawal better than
international law does. The constitutional concept is that exit from the EU
polity must always be possible – and that it must allow sufficient freedom,
without any necessary lock-ins of a future relationship.68 We do not contest
65. List of proposed amendments, cited supra note 50 at 45.
66. See Tatham, op. cit. supra note 2.
67. Hofmeister, “‘Should I stay or should I go?’– A critical analysis of the right to withdraw
from the EU”, 16 ELJ (2010), 592.
68. See Kostakopoulou, op. cit. supra note 10.
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the merits of that concept.69 At the same time, though, a “no-deal” withdrawal
clearly offends all that EU constitutional law holds dear, in terms of rights
protection, the rule of law, and the duty of cooperation. Thus, while it may not
impose an obligation on the withdrawing State to negotiate,Article 50 does, as
Hillion has put it, impose a “best endeavours obligation” on the EU to
negotiate and reach an agreement.70 The counterpart to the unilateral right of
withdrawal must indeed be to read Article 50 as embodying an exceptionally
strong preference for a negotiated, orderly, and well transitioned withdrawal,
over the “no-deal” outcome, at least on the part of the EU. This is in line both
with the Council’s guidelines following the UK’s notification71 and, more
broadly, with the way in which the EU generally handles constitutional crises.
The history of those crises shows that, invariably, the EU goes to great lengths
to find a negotiated settlement of some kind. Instances are the social rights
chapter at Maastricht, the creation of the euro and of Schengen, justice and
home affairs integration, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: each
accompanied with a UK opt-out (or a clarification in the case of the Charter).
Other instances are the first Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, or the
Danish opt-outs. It is therefore very much part of the EU’s constitutional ethos
to resolve crises through negotiation, and we consider that the EU is under a
constitutional obligation to do all it can to avoid a “no-deal” Brexit.72
4. The application of a constitutionalist reading ofArticle 50
So far, our discussion has shown that the avoidance of political opportunism
and the safeguarding of due process under national constitutional law
underpinned the drafting of Article 50, despite the vagueness of the
provision’s final text. These concerns and the possible implications of a
69. For debate on the merits, see Klabbers, “Continent in crisis”, 27 EJIL (2016), 553;
Costa, “Interpreting Article 50: Exit and voice and… What about loyalty?”, (2016) EUI
Working Papers RSCAS 2016/71.
70. Hillion, “Leaving the European Union, the Union way: A legal analysis of Article 50”,
(2016) Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies: European Policy Analysis, 2016–8, 6
<www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/Leaving%20the%20European%20Union,%20the%20Union
%20way%20(2016-8epa).pdf> (last visited 29 Mar. 2017). See also Medhi, “Brèves
observations sur la consécration constitutionnelle d’un droit de retrait volontaire” in Demaret,
Govaere and Hanf (Eds.), 30Years of European Legal Studies at the College of Europe/30 ans
d’études juridiques européennes au Collège d’Europe: Liber Professorum 1973/74–2003/04
(P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2005).
71. Council of the European Union, “Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom’s
notification under Article 50 TEU”, 31 Mar. 2017, XT 21001/17, 5, para 6.
72. This can be contrasted with the position detailed in the Guidelines, ibid., 3, para 1,
emphasizing that there can be no “cherry picking” on the part of the UK.
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constitutionally unregulated withdrawal need to be accommodated in the
interpretation of this provision. In the remainder of our discussion, we analyse
how the withdrawal process can in fact be carried out compatibly with a
constitutionalist reading of Article 50.
4.1. The decision to withdraw belongs to the withdrawing State, “in
accordance with its own constitutional requirements”
Article 50(1) provides that “any Member State may decide to withdraw from
the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”. Article
50(2) adds that the “Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the
European Council of its intention”. As discussed earlier, in the negotiations on
Article 50, the question of what should amount to a decision to withdraw was
discussed extensively. Not only had there been proposals to qualify the
possibility of taking that decision by making it dependent on Treaty change or
compliance with EU values. It had also been suggested that the phrase “in
accordance with its own constitutional requirements” should be removed
altogether as it was not in the EU’s interest, because it entrusted it with the
oversight of national constitutional requirements.73 The retention of this
phrase is therefore significant. It suggests that respect for the constitutional
requirements of a withdrawing State, whatever these may be, must underpin
the withdrawal process, even if it is less expedient or costlier for the Union.
This is in line with the advocated constitutionalist interpretation of Article
50, in that it makes express reference to respect for domestic constitutional
rules. Other international treaties, conventions and agreements that contain
withdrawal clauses do not make such reference.74 They are based on a classic
international law paradigm, which treats States as unitary actors whose
domestic constitutional arrangements are not a matter of international law. By
contrast, the inclusion of a clause of respect for national constitutional
identities in Article 4(2) TEU renders respect for national constitutional
traditions part of the EU’s own constitution.75
73. List of proposed amendments, cited supra note 50 at 60.
74. Helfer, “Terminating treaties” in The Oxford Guide toTreaties (OUP, 2012), pp. 641–3:
Approximately 60% of treaties surveyed contain an exit clause, but their terms vary
significantly depending on their subject, e.g. bilateral investment treaties often contain a
“continuation of effects” clause; arms treaties sometimes require a justification of withdrawal
etc.
75. See, on this point, Von Bogdandy and Schill, “Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect
for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty”, 48 CML Rev. (2011), 1417; Millet, “The respect
for national constitutional identity in the European legal space: An approach to federalism as
constitutionalism” in Azoulai (Ed.), The Question of Competence in the European Union (OUP,
2014).
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Obviously, the precise nature of the requirement under Article 50(1), as
well as its enforceability, are still open to debate. While the matter was
intensely litigated in the UK, up to the highest level, it would appear that the
UK has not yet determined precisely what its constitutional requirements are
except in a very general manner. In particular, the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Miller merely confirmed that, in light of the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty, the Government cannot notify under Article 50 without
Parliament’s express authorization, which was the key question in the
proceedings.76 Complying with this ruling, the Government put the European
Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill before Parliament. While the House
of Lords proposed amendments to the Bill regarding the protection of
acquired rights for EU citizens in the UK and the reservation of a second vote
in Parliament after an agreement had been negotiated, the House of Commons
overrode these amendments, and the legislation received the royal assent on 16
March 2017. A parliamentary sovereignty traditionalist might therefore argue
that there is no further need to determine what the constitutional requirements
of the UK are; the (European Union) Notification of Withdrawal Act is
constitutionally unchallengeable because the will of parliament cannot be the
subject of judicial review.77 While we cannot examine UK constitutional law
in detail in this paper, we have significant reservations on this point regarding
aspects of parliamentary sovereignty that the courts inMiller did not examine.
More specifically, in Miller, the Supreme Court simply found that “the
change in the law”, which the implementation of the result of the referendum
requires “must be made in the only way in which the UK constitution permits,
namely through Parliamentary legislation”.78 It refrained from looking further
into this question, stating that “what form such legislation should take is
entirely a matter for Parliament”.79 But does this mean that Parliament can,
through a single act, give carte blanche to the Government to negotiate the
UK’s withdrawal? Or must Parliament be in a position to vote on the terms of
the agreement itself, in a way which does not involve a mere rubber-stamping
at a later stage in the process?
A powerful legal opinion by Sir David Edward and others (hereafter
“Edward et al. Opinion”) points to the contrary.80 The Edward et al. Opinion
argues that the UK’s constitutional requirements include the need for
Parliament to approve the withdrawal agreement, because it is that agreement
76. Miller Supreme Court, para 101.
77. See R (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56.
78. Miller Supreme Court, para 121.
79. Ibid., para 122.
80. Edward, Jacobs, Lever, Mountfield and Facenna, “In the matter of Article 50 of the
Treaty on European Union”, Opinion for Bindmans LLP, 10 Feb. 2017, <www.bindmans.com/
uploads/files/documents/Final_Article_50_Opinion_10.2.17.pdf> (last visited 3 Apr. 2017).
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which will ultimately determine the fate of current rights under EU law.81 The
mere parliamentary authorization of the Article 50 notification is insufficient,
because it does not determine any actual changes to UK law after withdrawal.
On the basis ofMiller, therefore, the authors argue that a valid constitutional
decision to withdraw in accordance with the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty can ultimately be taken only at the conclusion of the Brexit
negotiations.82 Under the UK constitution, that decision is conditional on
ultimate parliamentary approval, and it is only at the end of the Article 50
negotiations, when the terms of withdrawal are clear, that there can be a final
decision on such withdrawal. Even if there is no withdrawal agreement, it is
but Parliament which can decide, at the end of the two-year process, that the
UK leaves the EU. That means that, under UK constitutional law, withdrawal
is a process requiring a series of steps.
Under EU law, the question that the Edward et al. Opinion raises is whether
their understanding of the UK’s constitutional requirements can be reconciled
with the terms of Article 50. On a bare reading of this provision, the decision
to withdraw (para 1) and its notification, which starts the two-year period
(para 2), are sequential. However, a constitutionalist interpretation requires
deep and genuine respect for the withdrawing Member State’s constitutional
requirements. In the UK context, those requirements mean that the ultimate
withdrawal decision can only be taken once the terms of the withdrawal
agreement and of the future relations between the withdrawing State and the
EU are fully known. Under Article 50(1), the EU should respect this.
Furthermore, this conception has merit, in particular because it is only in the
face of sufficient knowledge of the terms of withdrawal that a fully considered
decision can be taken. The Brexit debate amply shows this in the sense that the
sharpest critique of the referendum is that voters were unable to know what
the terms of Brexit were going to be.83 Moreover, there is some support for
such a reading in the text of Article 50, since paragraph 2 refers to notification
only of the “intention” to withdraw – thus suggesting, as we shall further argue
below, that the decision previously taken under Article 50(1) may be reversed.
Accordingly, whereas this position may not hold true for constitutional
orders in which parliamentary sovereignty is not a key constitutional
requirement, or indeed where the decision to withdraw may reflect a settled
position on a particular policy,84 in the legal and political context of Brexit, the
81. Ibid., paras. 22–23.
82. Ibid., paras. 26–28.
83. Cf. Weale, “The democratic duty to oppose Brexit”, lecture delivered at UCL on 8 Dec.
2016, <www.ucl.ac.uk/political-science/news/articles/121216> (last visited 13 Mar. 2017).
84. For instance, this was arguably the case in relation to Greenland, where the debate about
membership specifically concerned the EU fisheries policy: see further Tatham, op. cit. supra
note 2.
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constitutionally sound approach is to look at withdrawal as a process, more
than as a punctual decision. Indeed, as Gordon has noted, Brexit is driving
profound changes in the constitutional requirements of the UK itself, as it is
causing a sharp – and unusually rapid – codification of these requirements
through litigation.85 In line with the voluntary nature of withdrawal under
Article 50(1), Article 50 should therefore be read overall in a way that
accommodates the UK’s uncodified, political constitution as a form of
constitutional organization inherently susceptible to change through
politics.86
4.2. Revocability of the intention to withdraw
Since the UK’s decision to withdraw is not necessarily to be considered a
fixed one, taken prior to notification, a further key question for the overall
constitutionality of the withdrawal process arises: to what extent is a duly
notified intention to withdraw revocable – or, to use Lord Pannick’s now
famous analogy in Miller, must the bullet, once fired, necessarily reach its
target?87 The courts in Miller88 did not rule on this point, as the parties had
accepted that the notification is irrevocable, and the outcome of the Miller
litigation did not depend on it.89 In any event, UK courts would not have been
in a position to decide this question: it relates clearly to the interpretation of
Article 50, a provision of Union law and, as such, would have required a
reference to the ECJ. The question of revocability therefore remains alive and
of crucial legal importance.
The wording of Article 50 does not offer much help when it comes to
revocability. After stating that a Member State “may decide to withdraw from
the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”, Article 50
stipulates that the Member State in question “shall notify the European
Council of its intention”. Thus, Article 50 clearly distinguishes the decision to
withdraw (para 1) from its notification (para 2). While, as Jean-Claude Piris
85. Gordon, “Brexit: A challenge for the UK constitution, of the UK constitution?”, 12
EuConst (2016), 411.
86. Ibid., 436–437.
87. Transcript of Miller Divisional Court hearing, 19, <www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/20161013-all-day.pdf> (last visited 1 Dec. 2016).
88. The Supreme Court affirmed the Divisional Courts finding on this, at para 26.
89. Eeckhout, “Miller and the Art 50 notification: Revocability is irrelevant”,
London-Brussels One-Way or Return: A cross-channel Europe blog by Piet Eeckhout, 14 Nov.
2016, <www.londonbrussels.wordpress.com/2016/11/14/miller-and-the-art-50-notification-
revocability-is-irrelevant/> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016).
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has put it, “intentions” can change,90 textually Article 50(2) does not concern
the notification of a mere political intention, but of an intention based on a
decision to withdraw taken in accordance with a Member State’s
constitutional requirements. In turn, an intention of this kind has a clear legal
meaning and constitutional implications for the EU, as laid down in Article
50(3), namely the commencement of a two-year process for exit. In the run-up
to Miller (and, as noted above, in Miller itself), the assumption was that
notification would set in motion an irrevocable state of affairs – a two-year
clock that could no longer be stopped by UK action alone.91
In line with the discussion offered by the Edward et al. Opinion, though, the
analysis of whether and when a notification of withdrawal can be revoked
must be deepened. We fully agree with Paul Craig’s point that if a Member
State bona fide changes its mind about leaving, it would be absurd for the EU
– and indeed for other Member States – to force it to withdraw based on the
assumed irrevocability of Article 50.92 We also agree with Sarmiento that it
would “make no sense” for other EU Member States not to accept such a
change of heart, in light of the political and economic repercussions that a
withdrawal would cause to the EU overall.93 Article 50 can certainly be
stopped if everyone believes that this would be in their common interest. Yet,
the only question that bears constitutional and not just political relevance is
whether there is a possibility for a State unilaterally to revoke its notification,
even if other Member States and the Union institutions would prefer to go
ahead with withdrawal.
In our view, the distinction between the decision to withdraw and the
notification of the intention to do so is again critical. A Member State is
entitled to decide, in accordance with its constitutional requirements, to
withdraw from the EU. If that Member State re-considered that decision,
within the two-year timeframe, there would no longer be a domestic
constitutional basis for withdrawal.94 The reference to constitutional
requirements in Article 50(1) suggests that, in order to revoke the notification,
the withdrawing State would simply need to show that the decision to
90. Piris, “Article 50 is not for ever and the UK could change its mind”, Financial Times, 1
Sept. 2016, <www.ft.com/content/b9fc30c8-6edb-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926> (last visited 11
Dec. 2016).
91. See, most notably, King, Hickman and Barber, “Pulling the Article 50 ‘trigger’:
Parliament’s indispensable role”,UKConstitutional Law Blog, 27 June 2016, <www.ukconstit
utionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trig
ger-parliaments-indispensable-role/> (last visited 29 Mar. 2017).
92. Craig, “Brexit: A drama in six acts”, 41 EL Rev. (2016), 464.
93. Sarmiento, “Miller, Brexit and the (maybe not to so evil) Court of Justice”,
Verfassungsblog, 8 Nov. 2016, <www.verfassungsblog.de/miller-brexit-and-the-maybe-not-
to-so-evil-court-of-justice/> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016).
94. See Craig, op. cit. supra note 92 at 464.
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withdraw is no longer compatible with its constitutional requirements in that a
new decision has been taken.95
As Phillipson has noted, to draw any clear-cut distinction between Article
50(1) and Article 50(2) would be deeply formalistic.96 It is not possible to
ensure genuine respect for the constitutional requirements of the withdrawing
State, particularly in the UK context, if these are not respected throughout the
withdrawal process. Depending on what the constitutional requirements are,
that could mean the rejection of the decision to withdraw by Parliament only,
or by Parliament after a new referendum.97 It must be emphasized, though,
that in order for a new decision not to withdraw to reverse the withdrawal
process, that decision would need to be about withdrawal altogether, and not
just about the rejection of a specific agreement.
There is of course a need to avoid abuse of Article 50. The structure of the
provision tilts the scales in favour of the EU at the negotiation stage, at least to
some extent. But it could not be otherwise. In light of the autonomous power
to decide to withdraw in accordance with its own constitutional requirements
that Article 50 affords the withdrawing State, it is logical that the provision
then balances that discretion with stricter conditions upon notification. The
scope for abuse is clear: a State wishing to withdraw could notify, engage in a
two-year negotiation, withdraw that notification, and then re-notify and repeat
the process. That would have the effect of holding the Union and other
Member States hostage to an extended negotiation without engaging the
unanimity requirement set out in Article 50(3). And it is precisely that
possibility that, in light of the travaux, the drafters of the provision had sought
to prevent.
However, the possibility of abuse would be prevented by the requirement
that withdrawal of the notification should be in good faith. At this stage, the
extent to which the withdrawing State would be required to prove that it was
acting based on a genuine change of heart is difficult to predict. In light of the
fact that EU law has a distinct, but fairly limited doctrine of abuse of law,98 and
has never encountered that question in similar circumstances, the matter could
be litigated before the ECJ. Still, if a Member State could not withdraw its
95. Ibid.
96. Phillipson, “A dive into deep constitutional waters: Article 50, the prerogative and
parliament”, 79 MLR (2016), 1069.
97. On the latter point see Gordon, op. cit. supra note 85 at 429.
98. See Saydé, “Defining the concept of abuse of Union law”, 33 YEL (2014), 138 and,
more generally, Saydé, Abuse of EU Law and Regulation of the Internal Market (Hart, 2014).
The concept of abuse in EU law so far has mainly concerned issues such as the abuse of welfare
protections (see e.g. Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358) and questions of a regulatory
“race to the bottom” due to convenient choice of law – a question that became particularly clear
in Case C-438/05, ITWF v. Viking Line, EU:C:2007:772.
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notification after changing its mind, that would amount to expulsion from the
Union – a possibility that is considered and rejected in the travaux of the
provision.99 It would also be contrary to the principles of good faith, loyal
cooperation,100 and the Union’s commitment to respect the Member States’
constitutional identities101 – all of which are constitutional principles
requiring respect by EU institutions.
Yet, in the absence of abuse, it is difficult to detect constitutionally sound
reasons for rejecting revocability. It is true that revocation would be intrusive,
both at a political level for the EU and the other Member States, and at a
personal and business level for persons and companies making arrangements
for withdrawal. But so is a withdrawal which goes ahead. There can hardly be
a legitimate expectation on something as fundamental as withdrawal from the
EU.
A last point concerns the comparison with international law. Even if we
reject an internationalist reading of Article 50, that comparison is instructive.
Article 68 VCLT accepts that a withdrawal notification can be revoked “at any
time before it takes effect”. Earlier, we established that Article 50 differs from
the Vienna Convention in that it confirms a unilateral right to withdrawal. The
reason is a constitutionalist one: exit from the EU polity must always be
possible. It follows that Article 50 cannot be construed as prohibiting
revocability where international law does not: that would completely
contradict the respect for a domestic constitutional decision which lies at the
heart of the rationale and structure of this provision.
Thus, overall, provided there is a new decision not to withdraw taken in
good faith, the Article 50 clock can be stopped. After all, “the goal of the
Union is integration, not disintegration”.102
4.3. The withdrawal agreement
4.3.1. Legal basis
Article 50(2) TEU lays down the procedure to be followed for the negotiation
of an agreement, between the EU and the withdrawing State, “setting out the
arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future
relationship with the Union”. A bare reading of the provision reveals some
noteworthy points. The withdrawal agreement is subject to a qualified-
majority vote in the Council and needs the consent of the European
Parliament. However, there is no individual role for the Member States, and
the withdrawal agreement does not need their approval (it is not a “mixed”
99. List of proposed amendments, cited supra note 50 at 5.
100. Art. 4(3) TEU.
101. Ibid., Art. 4(2).
102. Duff, op. cit. supra note 24 at 9.
CML Rev. 2017714 Eeckhout and Frantziou
agreement). Further, the “arrangements for . . . withdrawal” are wholly
undefined, except for the proviso that account should be taken of the
framework for the future relationship. This is unspecific language open to a
range of different interpretations.
At the time of writing, the prevailing view in the EU appears to be that the
withdrawal agreement can or will only deal with the actual terms of
withdrawal, and that the future relationship will need to be negotiated
post-Brexit when the UK will have become a third country.103 There is also
speculation about a transitional period, the terms of which may or may not be
part of the withdrawal agreement. As regards any future agreement, it is
frequently pointed out that such an agreement is likely to be mixed, with all the
attendant difficulties of securing approval by all Member States in accordance
with their constitutional requirements.104
However, a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 requires that these
various assumptions be subjected to a deeper analysis. There is a whole body
of law on EU competence, internal and external; on the reasons for mixed
agreements; and on the appropriate legal basis for the conclusion of an
international agreement.105 As no decisions have been taken yet on how
withdrawal and future relations will be structured, it is too early to offer any
in-depth analysis. Nevertheless, the existing body of law allows for some
initial comments on the proposed course of action.
A first question is the extent to which the withdrawal agreement could
regulate the future relationship between the UK and the EU. The wording of
Article 50(2) instructs the negotiators to take account of the framework for the
future relationship. These are enigmatic terms, in that they neither spell out
what is meant by this “framework” nor whether that framework needs to be
part of a separate agreement. Textually, all that can be said is that the
withdrawal agreement should include references to the future relationship.
However, it is less obvious to read Article 50 as conferring competence on the
EU to regulate, in the withdrawal agreement, both the terms of withdrawal and
the full organization of the future relationship. That would appear to involve
substantially more than “setting out the arrangements for . . . withdrawal”.
It must nonetheless be noted that agreements concluded by the EU may
have more than one provision in the EU Treaties as their legal basis. In terms
103. Draft guidelines, cited supra note 71, para 4. For a useful summary of this view, see
Flavier and Platon, “Brexit: A tale of two agreements?”, European Law Blog, 30 Aug. 2016,
<www.europeanlawblog.eu/?p=3324> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016).
104. See e.g. Maresceau, “A typology of mixed bilateral agreements” in Hillion and
Koutrakos (Eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World
(Hart, 2010), p. 17.
105. See e.g. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2011), chapters 2–5.
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of EU legal principle, we do not see any significant barriers to a withdrawal
agreement which also regulates the future relationship on a legal basis
different from Article 50 TEU. If that future relationship were confined to
trade matters, Article 207 TFEU would constitute the relevant provision. If,
however, the future relationship includes a range of EU policy areas in which
the UK may wish to continue to cooperate with the EU, as could perhaps be
expected despite all the talk about a “hard Brexit”, an association pursuant to
Article 217 TFEU ought to be considered. The latter provision is as vague as
Article 50, in that an association is barely defined: it involves “reciprocal
rights and obligations, common action and special procedure”. The ECJ has
determined that an association agreement empowers the EU to guarantee
commitments towards non-Member States in all the fields covered by the
Treaties.106 The competence to conclude association agreements is, in
substantive terms, the broadest external competence for which the EU
Treaties provide. The judgment inDemirel is telling in this respect. It accepted
that the association agreement with Turkey could provide for some measure of
free movement of workers, even if at the time no express competences in the
field of immigration from third countries had been conferred upon the EEC.
An association agreement with the UK could, likewise, guarantee
commitments in all the fields covered by the Treaties.107
An often heard argument against the combination of Article 50 (the
withdrawal agreement) with an association or trade agreement regulating the
future relationship consists of pointing out that the latter type of agreement
can only be negotiated and concluded with a “third country” (see also Art. 218
TFEU).108 The UK, by contrast, remains a Member State in the course of the
withdrawal process, and the withdrawal agreement could therefore be seen as
a sui generis agreement: with a Member State, but regulating its exit from the
EU. Article 50, as the legal basis for such a sui generis agreement, could then
not be combined with a legal basis regulating the future relationship with the
UK as a third country.
However, such a distinction does not survive closer scrutiny. Article 50(3)
conceives of the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement as coinciding
with actual Brexit, i.e. with the UK being released from its Treaty obligations,
losing its Member State status, and becoming a third country. The agreement
therefore regulates the future relationship just as much as any other agreement
would. Just think of one of the core features of the agreement in current
106. Case C-12/86, Demirel, EU:C:1987:400, para 9 (at the time the Court of course
referred to the EEC and to the EEC Treaty, but it can be assumed that today an association may
cover policies in both the TEU and the TFEU).
107. See also Case C-81/13, UK v. Council EU:C:2014:2449.
108. See the Draft guidelines, cited supra note 71 at 4, para 4.
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political discourse: the protection of the rights of EU citizens in the UK, and
UK citizens in the EU (the “acquired rights” issue). This protection will be
part of the future relationship with the UK, just as much as any (hypothetical)
decision to maintain tariff-free trade. Of course the withdrawal agreement will
be negotiated when the UK continues to be a Member State, but what matters
in legal terms (including questions of competence) is the nature of the
international commitments undertaken at the point of conclusion and entry
into force. The withdrawal agreement is, of necessity, predicated on the UK
becoming a third country, and in that respect indistinguishable from a trade or
association agreement with the UK based on Article 207 or 217 TFEU
respectively, and negotiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 218
TFEU.
A further point to note is that, even if most association agreements are
mixed agreements, it is doubtful whether the determination of the future
relationship requires mixity. The justification for mixed agreements reflects
the cardinal EU constitutional principle of limited and conferred powers. As
clearly stated in Article 5(2) TEU, “competences not conferred upon the
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”. Withdrawal, however,
is a special case. In all matters covered by the Treaties, the EU Member States
have conferred the power to regulate their relationship with the UK on the EU,
simply by virtue of the UK’s current membership. Take immigration as an
example. The EU’s competences to regulate immigration of third-country
nationals are clearly defined, leaving most of the substance of immigration
policies to national competence.109 However, as far as UK citizens are
concerned, there is at present no such national competence, because UK
citizens are EU citizens benefitting from free movement.
The UK remains a Member State throughout the withdrawal process. If a
full agreement on the future relationship were to be reached in the course of
that process, it is difficult to see any strict legal reasons for mixity. The EU’s
implied powers doctrine may be relevant here.110 Such powers normally flow
from EU legislation, but in the pending proceedings on the EU-Singapore
agreement the Commission advocates an extension to matters regulated in the
Treaties themselves.111 The argument is that the regulation of portfolio
investment, whilst not within the scope of the concept of foreign direct
investment in Article 207(1) TFEU, is within the EU’s exclusive competence
because such investment is covered by the TFEU provisions on free movement
of capital. It remains to be seen whether this argument will be accepted, but at
109. Art. 79 TFEU.
110. See, for the latest account of implied powers, Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty,
EU:C:2017:114.
111. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, FTA with Singapore, EU:C:2016:992.
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least it shows that the extension of an implied-powers type reasoning to the
Treaties is not unimaginable.112 Furthermore, there is of course also plenty of
EU legislation – nearly the whole of the acquis communautaire – which risks
being “affected” or whose scope will be altered by Brexit. This would
normally trigger exclusive EU competence. It is true that the potential effect
on the acquis is not a substantive one, but is more of a territorial kind. In that
sense one cannot say that the existing case law on exclusive implied powers
offers a clear precedent. Nevertheless, there is an obvious analogy, in that EU
law has “occupied the field” of regulating the relationship between the UK
and other EU Member States across the acquis.
4.3.2. Protection of acquired rights
As there is a basis in the Treaties for a Member State to exit the Union and the
maintenance of existing rights has not been made a precondition for exit, it
might be assumed that, in principle, withdrawal can entail the loss of any rights
associated with membership. Indeed, Article 50 does not specifically provide
for guarantees of the status of EU citizens in the withdrawing State and vice
versa. Furthermore, as noted earlier, at the Constitutional Convention a
number of delegates had proposed amendments that safeguarded existing
rights, which were not adopted.113 However, there is a strong constitutional
case for making the maintenance of acquired rights an essential element of an
agreement.114 A meaningful constitutional interpretation of Article 50 indeed
requires in-depth consideration of respect for individual rights as one of the
most settled features of the EU constitutional order to date.115 That is
especially the case insofar as agreement on the status of acquired rights was
not reached during the travaux.116
112. See also Case C-431/11, UK v. Council EU:C:2013:589; and Case C-656/11, UK v.
Council EU:C:2014:97 (confirming Art. 48 TFEU as the legal basis for new provisions on
social security in the context of, respectively, the EEA and the EU-Switzerland agreement on
free movement of persons).
113. E.g. see Danish amendment, List of proposed amendments, cited supra note 50 at 20.
114. See also the Draft guidelines, cited supra note 71.
115. Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454; Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P, Kadi and Al
Barakaat.
116. We note that existing rights under EU law do not pertain merely to the doctrine of
acquired rights under international law and, particularly Art. 70(1)b of the VCLT, which has a
narrower reach. The latter doctrine would likely have a limited impact on the conduct of the
negotiations: see Lalive, “The doctrine of acquired rights” in Rights and Duties of Private
Investors Abroad (Matthew Bender, 1965), pp. 145 et seq.; Douglas-Scott, “What happens to
‘acquired rights’ in the event of a Brexit?”, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 16 May 2016,
<www.ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/05/16/sionaidh-douglas-scott-what-happens-to-acquired
-rights-in-the-event-of-a-brexit/> (last visited 19 Dec. 2016); Piris, “Should the UK withdraw
from the EU: Legal aspects and possible options”, Foundation Robert Schuman Policy Paper
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Space does not permit exhaustive exploration of the vast array of issues that
arise on the topic of acquired rights. We will therefore merely offer some
limited observations on the constitutional obligations of the UK and the EU,
regarding: the protection of the rights to private and family life of UK
nationals in the EU and EU citizens in the UK, in the withdrawal agreement
(4.3.2.1.); the protection against uncertainty during the negotiations for UK
nationals in the EU and EU citizens in the UK (4.3.2.2.); the protection of
other acquired rights in the withdrawal agreement, for those who have
exercised them before the UK’s withdrawal (4.3.2.3.); and, finally, the
maintenance of rights associated with EU citizenship for UK nationals
(4.3.2.4.). We cannot fully address a series of sub-issues that may be further
explored and which we can only list here in outline, such as the precise degree
to which human rights will remain protected in the UK after withdrawal under
UK law; and the rights of EU citizens moving to the UK and UK nationals
moving to the EU at different stages of the withdrawal process. We must also
highlight that, in our discussion, we refer jointly to Strasbourg case law and
the case law of the ECJ, premised on the settled position of full respect for the
European Convention of Human Rights in EU law and without delving further
into debates about the autonomy of EU law that may be raised in this
context.117
4.3.2.1. Protection of the rights to private and family life in the
withdrawal agreement
Regression in the level of protection of human rights is a key issue in the
withdrawal process and must be addressed in the agreement itself. Insofar as
the UK is concerned, it must be pointed out that the ECHR protects the right to
reside and the right to family life of those who have made meaningful ties in
the host Member State118 and construes these concepts broadly.119 It is clear
that Article 8 ECHR will be engaged should the UK wish to expel EU citizens
No. 355 (2015), 10, <www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-355-en.pdf>
(last visited 19 Dec. 2016). Instead, our concern is with the fate of the obligations that arise from
EU law itself.
117. For a discussion of this point see further Eeckhout, “Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to
the ECHR and judicial dialogue: Autonomy or autarky?”, 38 Fordham International Law
Review (2015), 955; Eeckhout, “Human rights and the autonomy of EU law: Pluralism or
integration?”, 66 Current Legal Problems (2013), 169.
118. Ibid. See ECtHR, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 50963/99, judgment of 20 June
2002, para 114; ECtHR, Samsonnikov v.Estonia,Appl. No. 52178/10, judgment of 3 July 2012;
ECtHR, Slivenko v. Latvia, Appl. No. 48321/99, judgment of 9 Oct. 2003; ECtHR, Anam v.
United Kingdom, Appl. No. 21783/08, judgment of 7 June 2011; ECtHR, AA v. United
Kingdom, Appl. No. 8000/08, judgment of 20 Sept. 2011.
119. ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany, Appl. No. 13710/88, judgment of 16 Dec. 1992, para
29; ECtHR,Onur v.United Kingdom,Appl. No. 27319/07, judgment of 17 Feb. 2008, para 46;
ECtHR, Samsonnikov v. Estonia, para 81.
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who will be largely covered by existing ECtHR case law.120 At a minimum, the
ECHR level of protection of the rights to private and family life must be
maintained in the agreement. Any agreement that does not meet this level will
be constitutionally challengeable in both the UK and the EU. Indeed, it is clear
that precisely the same considerations apply to UK nationals currently
residing in other EU Member States. All of the Member States remain
signatories of the Convention and respect for the ECHR has underpinned the
ECJ’s case law from its early years.121 It is therefore incontrovertible that,
from the EU perspective, any negotiation or agreement that does not guarantee
existing ECHR rights will be inherently problematic.
In fact, the main interpretative issues in this field do not concern this
minimum. Rather, they pertain to the extent to which the rights to private and
family life must be guaranteed in the sense in which they are understood in the
EU at present. It is clear that, for EU institutions and remaining Member
States, the relevant interpretation of these rights will be not just that of the
ECHR, but that of the Treaties and the Charter – that is the basis on which they
will be held to account in the first instance.122 Pursuant to Article 52 EUCFR,
the level of protection offered by the Charter must meet the ECHR standard,
but it can also go beyond it. EU law is indeed more extensive than the ECHR
in its protection of the rights of citizens so that the process of the negotiations
and any potential agreement are likely to require a heightened degree of
constitutional scrutiny on the EU side.
More specifically, the right to private and family life requires observance
within EU law under Article 7 of the Charter as well as Article 19(1) thereof,
which protects against collective expulsions. Furthermore, when considered
together, Article 7 EUCFR and Articles 20–21 TFEU in conjunction with
secondary legislation,123 create stronger rights to family reunification for EU
citizens and their family members to enter the UK than the ECHR has so
far accommodated.124 In particular, EU law has offered EU citizens the
120. Human Rights Committee, “The human rights implications of Brexit: Written
evidence from Dr Kirsty Hughes”, HRB0009, <www.data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/human-rights-committee/what-are-the-human-rig
hts-implications-of-brexit/written/38477.html#_ftn12> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016),
paras. 5–25.
121. See Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, EU:C:1970:114, para 4; see
also Case C-4/73, Nold v. Commission, EU:C:1974:51, para 13; Case C-44/79, Hauer v. Land
Rheinland-Pfalz, EU:C:1979:290, paras. 15–17.
122. Case C-501/10, Kamberaj, EU:C:2012:233, paras. 62–63 and 80.
123. Directive 2004/38/EC, cited supra note 35, Arts. 2–3.
124. Hughes, cited supra note 120, paras. 27–31. See ECtHR, Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v.United Kingdom, Appl. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81, judgment of 28 May
1985; ECtHR, Gül v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 23218/94, judgment of 19 Feb.1996; ECtHR,
Ahmut v. Netherlands, Appl. No. 21702/93, judgment of 28 Nov. 1996; ECtHR, Sen v.
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opportunity to reunite with their core family as well as other dependent family
members both from within the EU and from third countries, provided they
meet certain conditions, and has offered them the right of non-discrimination
on grounds of nationality upon valid entry.125 This is what the debate about the
maintenance of private and family life should therefore focus on.
EU institutions and existing Member States will not be in a position to
negotiate any reduction in the level of protection of private and family life for
UK nationals living in the EU. While UK nationals will not necessarily
continue to benefit from the Citizens’ Directive if they are no longer EU
citizens, they will nonetheless continue to benefit from the right to private and
family life protected in Article 7 EUCFR and the Court’s existing case law,126
and not merely the case law of the ECtHR. Furthermore, UK nationals
currently living in other Member States would have once been EU citizens,
who have built their lives by relying on the Union’s most basic freedom to
move to and reside in another Member State. It would be deeply problematic
if the impact on their lives of a sudden change of status were excluded from the
assessment of the meaning of Article 7 EUCFR in the EU context. Even if it
were not a breach of international human rights law for the EU not to
recognize that the private and family life of UK nationals residing in the EU
comprises rights to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and family
reunification (and, as we will go on to explain, in our assessment it would also
amount to a breach of Art. 8 ECHR), it would still go against the Union’s
stated respect for values such as the dignity of the person and the rule of law,
as listed in Article 2 TEU and further expressed in the Charter’s Preamble and
Article 1 thereof.
But it should also not be assumed that the ECHR standard of protection of
the rights to private and family life will remain static or that it will not take into
account the fact that the relationship between the UK and the EU so far has
comprised family reunification and full protection against discrimination in
seeking and finding work, and engaging in other activities that make private
and family life meaningful, or indeed, possible. As the ECtHR put the matter
in Chapman, “if the home was lawfully established, this factor would
self-evidently be something which would weigh against the legitimacy of
Netherlands, Appl. No. 31465/96, judgment of 21 Dec. 2001; ECtHR, Senchishak v. Finland,
Appl. No. 5049/12, judgment of 18 Nov. 2014; ECtHR, AS v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 39350/13,
judgment of 30 June 2015.
125. Directive 2004/38/EC, cited supra note 35, Arts. 2, 3 and 7.
126. See, by analogy Case C-413/99, Baumbast, EU:C:2002:493; Case C-200/02, Zhu and
Chen, EU:C:2004:639; Case C-127/08, Metock and Others, EU:C:2008:449; Case C-34/09,
Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124.
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requiring the individual to move”.127 This suggests, firstly, that the principle of
non-regression of rights lawfully acquired will be significant for the ECtHR in
its assessment of Article 8 ECHR, should it be raised in this connection.
Secondly, in our view, a broad construction of that principle is likely to be
employed. The Convention is a “living instrument” that develops in line with
the context and needs of the time and place at which it is applied128 and the
ECtHR has over time become more receptive to broader conceptions of private
life, and now considers work a central aspect thereof.129 It has also referred to
the Charter and EU case law to support decisions that heighten the standard in
its interpretation of ECHR articles, including Article 8.130 In our view,
therefore, it would be very unlikely that expulsions, but indeed any reduction
in the existing level of protection of the right to private and family life of EU
citizens in the UK and UK nationals in the EU, would be allowed under the
ECHR. Both the EU and the UK are under a constitutional obligation to
ensure the maintenance of a high level of respect for the rights to private and
family life, and to construe these rights broadly, after withdrawal.
But to what extent is that state of affairs to be determined in a withdrawal
agreement? Our analysis implies that, absent any agreement, both the UK and
the EU would be under separate obligations to respect the rights to private and
family life to a comparable degree under, on the one hand the ECHR, and on
the other hand the ECHR, EUCFR, and general principles of EU law. This
observation nonetheless also highlights the constitutional duties of the Union
in concluding a withdrawal agreement with the withdrawing State. The EU is
under a clear obligation to conclude an agreement with the UK that protects
fundamental rights. Two of the Union’s objectives are to “uphold and
promote” its values in its external relations131 and to ensure the “well-being of
its peoples”.132 Furthermore, Article 3(5) TEU provides that human rights
must be ensured in the Union’s relations with third countries. Guaranteeing
the protection of the rights to private and family life is, therefore, crucial to the
127. ECtHR, Chapman v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 27238/95, judgment of 18 Jan.
2001, para 102.
128. ECtHR, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 5856/72, judgment of 25 Apr. 1978,
para 31.
129. ECtHR, Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania,Appl. No. 55480/00, judgment of 27 July
2004; see further Mantouvalou, “Work and private life: Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania” 30
EL Rev. (2005), 573; Mantouvalou, op. cit. supra note 18.
130. ECtHR,Goodwin v. theUnitedKingdom,Appl. No. 28957/95, 27 Mar. 1996, para 100.
See also, for a more detailed analysis, Dickson, “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights” (2015) European Human Rights Law
Review, 40.
131. Art. 3(5) TEU.
132. Ibid., Art. 3(1).
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constitutionality of the agreement. Put simply, any agreement the EU
negotiates must be based on continued respect by the UK for the rights to
private and family life of EU citizens and, of course, an unconditional
guarantee, in turn, of these rights for UK nationals. The introduction of any
clauses seeking to limit these rights would not be concomitant with the
Union’s commitment to human rights. It is therefore in the interests of the
parties to conclude an agreement that makes specific provision for – and is
premised upon respect of – these rights as they are understood today under a
commonly acceptable external standard (the ECHR).
4.3.2.2. Protection against uncertainty during the negotiations and the use
of human beings as “bargaining chips”
The argument concerning the rights to private and family life can be taken
further. As Mantouvalou has noted, the current position of EU citizens in the
UK (and, likewise, of UK nationals in the EU) raises questions of
compatibility with the ECHR.133 The uncertainty and instability that these
two groups face in the aftermath of the Brexit vote and the use of human
beings as “bargaining chips” in the negotiations, which follows from the lack
of specific guarantees about their status on both sides, is prejudicial to the
rights to private and family life and can amount to a breach of Article 8 ECHR
in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR.134 These rights also have a life in EU
constitutional law under Articles 7 and 21 of the Charter. Indeed, the case for
protecting against the perseverance of uncertainty for both EU citizens in the
UK and UK nationals in other EU Member States is even stronger under
the Charter: Articles 1 and 3 thereof protect the right to human dignity and the
integrity of the person, respectively. In a situation falling within the scope of
EU law, which Brexit inevitably is, those rights require respect by all existing
Member States (including the UK) and by the EU institutions.135
In its report on safeguarding acquired rights during Brexit, the House of
Lords urged the Government to proceed with a unilateral guarantee of the
rights of EU citizens in the UK.136 Similar statements have been occasionally
133. Mantouvalou, op. cit. supra note 18.
134. Ibid.; Lock and Patel, “Brexit: Constitutional and legal requirements”, UCL Public
Policy Research Insights, July 2016, <www.ucl.ac.uk/public-policy/for-policy-professionals/
research-insights/brexit-constitutional-and-legal-requirements.pdf> (last visited 11 Dec.
2016). See also House of Lord European Union Committee, Brexit: Acquired rights, 10th
Report of Session 2016–17, HL Paper 82, paras. 88–92, <www.publications.parlia
ment.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/82/82.pdf> (last visited 15 Dec. 2016).
135. Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, para 19.
136. House of Lord European Union Committee, Brexit: Acquired rights, cited supra note
134, paras. 147–148.
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made by EU officials.137 However, so far, neither side has adopted an official
position on the matter, thus causing the two affected groups substantial
uncertainty for almost a year following the referendum, as well as the
possibility of at least two years of further uncertainty. On the one hand, the UK
has not, in its letter of notification of withdrawal, made any unilateral
guarantees regarding the status of EU citizens other than merely making
known an intention to “strike early agreement” about these rights. On the other
hand, in its response to the UK’s notification, the European Council as well as
its President, in his separate remarks, stated that the EU would strive to
“minimize the uncertainty” created by the UK’s notification for EU citizens,
but also did not provide any formal guarantees of the status of UK nationals
currently residing in the EU.138 While the Council’s Draft Guidelines on
negotiating Brexit are to be welcomed insofar as they clarify that “enforceable
guarantees” on the status of citizens who have moved will be a priority for the
negotiations, they are clearly premised on the idea that these guarantees must
be “reciprocal”.139 Political discourse on both sides is therefore still keeping
the status of the two affected migrant groups on the negotiating table.
Not only does the position of both parties on the subject of EU citizens in
the UK and UK nationals in the EU place these groups in a position of
uncertainty. The assessment of the human rights implications of the
negotiations and agreement cannot be made in a vacuum. It is clear that, in the
UK context in particular, the withdrawal cannot be disassociated from rhetoric
that, as Paul Craig has put it, “bordered on the xenophobic, and in some
instances crossed that line”.140 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the “Leave”
vote, there are increasing reports about the use of this uncertainty of status to
intimidate, limit access to facilities that EU citizens in the UK previously
enjoyed, and/or collect additional personal data through resources lawfully
enjoyed to date, such as schooling or healthcare.141 While no reports of the
137. See e.g. Ross and Rankin, “European Parliament Brexit chief: ‘Let Britons keep
freedom of movement’”, The Guardian, 10 Mar. 2017, <www.theguardian.com/politics/
2017/mar/10/let-britons-keep-freedom-of-movement-says-eus-brexit-negotiator> (last visited
11 Mar. 2017).
138. European Council Press Releases and Statements, “Statement by the European
Council (Art. 50) on the UK notification”, cited supra note 1; European Council Press Releases
and Statements, “Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the UK notification”, No.
160/17, 29 Mar. 2017, <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/29-tusk-
remarks-uk-notification/> (last visited 29 Mar. 2017).
139. Draft guidelines, cited supra note 71 at 5, para 8.
140. Craig, op. cit. supra note 92 at 455.
141. In the UK, these concerns are severe: the UK Government itself has sought to collect
data relating to EU status in the latest school census (Department for Education, “National
statistics: Schools, pupils and their characteristics”, Jan. 2016, <www.gov.uk/government/
statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-characteristics-january-2016>), for which it has been
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same nature in respect of UK nationals in the EU have come to our attention,
as a matter of principle, the argument applies to them just as much.
It is in line with settled case law of both the ECtHR and the ECJ that the
failure to take adequate measures to protect the rights derived, respectively,
from the ECHR and from EU law, can itself amount to a breach thereof.142 The
failure to take measures to guarantee that status can in itself amount to a
breach of both ECHR and EU law and can form the subject of litigation before
national courts, the ECtHR, and the ECJ, as it creates significant distress and
deeply destabilizes private lives lawfully established in the host State.143 That
claim becomes increasingly stronger, the longer the period of uncertainty is
maintained as we embark on the formal negotiations.
It follows that, based on a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 TEU, the
guarantee of the rights to private and family life as assessed in section 4.3.2.1.
above must not only be the object of any eventual agreement, but the very
starting point of any negotiations so as to preclude the dehumanization
ensuing from the use of rights as bargaining chips.
4.3.2.3. Regression in the level of protection of other acquired rights
In addition to the rights to private and family life, the withdrawal of a Member
State from the EU creates significant scope for regression in terms of
fundamental rights not protected independently in the Convention, and of a
panoply of other rights of persons and companies. While the Great Repeal Bill
may not immediately repeal UK legislation implementing EU directives and
framework decisions,144 these rights will be removed from their parent
legislation and the jurisdiction of the ECJ, resulting in reduced possibilities of
judicial review; they will lose the primacy of EU law over inconsistent UK
deeply criticized; Adams and Belam, “Why parents are refusing to reveal their child’s
nationality’, The Guardian, 8 Oct. 2016, <www.theguardian.com/education/2016/oct/08/
boycottschoolcensus-why-parents-are-refusing-to-reveal-their-childs-nationality> (last visited
29 Mar. 2017). Access to healthcare has been another key issue in the UK, raising a series of
questions about entitlement to reside and the government’s failure to communicate the relevant
rules clearly: Herbec´, “The scandal of CSI, the little-known loophole used to deny EU citizens
permanent residency”, LSE Brexit Blog, 17 Mar. 2017, <www.blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/03
/17/disheartened-and-disappointed-the-government-and-universities-have-failed-eu-citizens-
over-comprehensive-sickness-insurance/> (last visited 29 Mar. 2017).
142. Respectively: ECtHR, Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria, Appl. No.
10126/82, judgment of 21 June 1988, para 34; Case C-265/95, Commission v. France (Spanish
Strawberries), EU:C:1997:346; see also Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria,
EU:C:2002:437.
143. See ECtHR, Chapman v. UK, Appl. No. 27238/95, para 102.
144. See Łazowski, op. cit. supra note 40. See also Łazowski, “Unilateral withdrawal from
the EU: Realistic scenario or a folly?” (2016) Journal of European Public Policy, 5–7.
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legislation; and there is no safeguard against future repeal. While there is
scope for discussing these issues in detail in the context of the future
relationship between the UK and the EU, this is largely subject to political
negotiations. Of course, the EU cannot compel the UK to apply EU law after
withdrawal. But that does not mean that the suspension of EU rights exercised
before Brexit would be constitutionally unproblematic, either for the EU or for
the UK.
Regression in the level of protection of any acquired rights (e.g. the free
movement of persons or even the free movement of goods) can be
constitutionally destabilizing to the extent that it is prejudicial to the principles
of legal certainty and legitimate expectations – essential elements of a
well-functioning constitutional polity.145 These principles form part of the
constitutional orders of both the EU and the UK.146
The argument is strongest as regards the rights of UK nationals in the EU
that amount to EU fundamental rights applicable to residents,147 as enshrined
in the Charter and the general principles of EU law, regardless of whether they
are ultimately also comprised in the right to private and family life under
Article 8 ECHR or not. Firstly, in light of the EU’s continuing constitutional
commitment to these sources of rights protection, UK nationals in the EU are
in a greatly advantageous position, in the sense that, even if the negotiations
for an agreement failed, the EU would still be under an internal obligation to
protect the fundamental rights of all those residing in its territory. In turn, this
makes the case for trying to reach agreement on the same basis for EU citizens
in the UK even clearer from a pragmatic point of view: since these rights will
remain in place across the Union, UK nationals residing therein will continue
to enjoy them in full. EU institutions must therefore strive to reach an
agreement in which acquired rights derived from EU law continue to be
protected in the UK in respect of EU citizens and other EU legal persons in the
UK, in the form and level that they were understood at the time of
145. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy (Polity Press, 1996), p. 198.
146. In the EU see e.g. Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri, EU:C:2016:278, paras. 38 et seq.;
Joined Cases C-177, Ampafrance & 181/99, Sanofi, EU:C:2000:470, para 67; Case C-74/74,
CNTA, EU:C:1975:59; Joined Cases C-7/56 & 3-7/57, Algera and Others v. Common
Assembly, EU:C:1957:7. In the UK see Laker Airways v. Department of Trade [1977] QB 463.
See also the application of the principle of legality, which requires that statutory authority for
the removal of rights should be plain. Ex p Witham [1988] QB 575, 581; Ex p Simms [2000] 2
AC 115, para 131; HM Treasury v. Ahmed [2010] 2 AC 534, para 61. For a comparative
overview see Schonberg, “Legal certainty and revocation of administrative decisions: A
comparative study of English, French, and EC Law”, 19 YEL (1999), 257.
147. We consider rights expressly reserved to citizens of the Union rather than residents,
such as voting rights, under a separate heading, in section 4.3.2.4.
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withdrawal.148 The claim here may not be binding as to result, as it is clear
that, by virtue of the existence of Article 50 TEU, there is no legitimate
expectation of a Member State always remaining in the Union. There is,
however, a legitimate expectation on the part of EU citizens that EU
institutions will seek to protect them in case of a withdrawal, by making
provision for the continued application of EU law for as long as EU citizens
are present in the UK (and vice versa), including the ability to build up
permanent residence entitlement, to work, and not to be discriminated against
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and secondary legislation.
Furthermore, safeguards such as the promulgation of the results of the
negotiations and adequate notice periods to those benefitting from EU
freedoms, who may be affected by changes to their status, may also be
required under UK law, at least insofar as the rights of natural persons are
required. The choice of moving to the UK has been embedded in a system of
rights protection that allowed for the same rights in key aspects of life in the
host State and provided for complete protection from discrimination on
grounds of nationality. And as Lord Kerr has put it, particularly when the
government has previously committed to a certain level of protection of
human rights, “it should be held to account in the courts as to its actual
compliance with that standard”.149
4.3.2.4. The loss of EU citizenship for UK nationals
Our last point on the question of acquired rights relates to the status of UK
citizens post-Brexit and the loss of their EU citizenship. Not only EU citizens
in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, but indeed all UK citizens have so far
been entitled to claim “civis europaeus sum”150 and the rights that come with
that status. It is settled EU law that citizenship of the Union is destined to
become the “fundamental status” of nationals of the Member States.151 On the
one hand, since the Treaties provide for voluntary withdrawal from the Union,
it is impossible to argue that the status of citizenship must be retained for UK
citizens. On the other hand, though, it is important to refer back to the
148. As Schonberg points out, a distinction can be made between prospective revocation of
rights and retrospective revocation, in the sense that the latter has far more profound
implications for the right-holders: op. cit. supra note 146 at 258–259.
149. 33R (SG & Ors) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, para
235; Fredman et al., “The human rights implications of Brexit”, Oxford Human Rights Hub
Submission to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on Brexit, 12 Oct. 2016, 15–16,
<ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/The-Human-Rights-Implications
-of-Brexit.pdf> (last visited 13 Apr. 2017).
150. Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis, EU:C:1992:504, para 46.
151. Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para 31; see also Case C-413/99,
Baumbast; Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano.
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discussion of Article 50(1) in the travaux and to highlight the crucial nature of
respect for constitutional requirements in doing so. To remove citizenship is
not something that should be done lightly. As Hannah Arendt had argued, the
loss of the ability to belong and to claim rights within a political community
amounts to the loss of the very “right to have rights”.152 Can all UK citizens be
stripped of their EU citizenship at once, even if they have not voluntarily
renounced it? This is not merely a question of UK law or of inter-State
politics, but connects with case law of the ECJ that requires a degree of respect
for EU citizenship.153 That case law provides that “by reason of its nature and
consequences” the loss of EU citizenship is subject to EU law principles.154
It is noteworthy in this regard that, while the Commission has rejected a
petition entitled “Stop Brexit”, since it would contravene the possibility of
withdrawal under Article 50 TEU, it has registered two European Citizens’
Initiatives regarding the maintenance of citizenship rights after Brexit. It
remains to be seen how these will be dealt with, but the Commission has
highlighted that while it “cannot propose secondary legislation aiming at
granting EU citizenship to natural persons who do not hold the nationality of
a Member State of the Union, the rights of EU citizens in the UK and the rights
of UK citizens in the EU after the withdrawal of the UK will be at the core of
the upcoming Article 50 negotiations”.155 Furthermore, these initiatives
highlight the precarious nature of any assumptions being made about EU
citizenship having been voluntary renounced by UK nationals, on the basis of
the referendum result alone. That is also supported, as Paul Craig notes, by the
demographics of the referendum itself and the clear preference of younger
voters for remaining in the EU.156
It follows that, despite being a necessary consequence of withdrawal from
the EU, which is envisaged in the Treaties and hence cannot be reviewed, the
legality of the loss of EU citizenship does trigger EU constitutional
guarantees. If EU citizenship has, as Advocate General Sharpston put it in
Zambrano, come to mean more than just cross-border movement but a
“uniform set of rights and obligations in a Union under the rule of law”,157
then its removal must also be made in accordance therewith. It necessitates, in
particular, compliance with common EU and UK values and general
152. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd ed. (Harcourt, 1958), p. 296.
153. Case C-135/08, Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern, EU:C:2010:104.
154. Ibid., para 42.
155. European Commission Press Release, “European Commission registers two European
Citizens’ Initiatives on the rights of Union citizens after Brexit and rejects one on preventing
Brexit”, IP/17/649, 22 Mar. 2017, <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-649_en.htm>
(last visited 29 Mar. 2017).
156. See Craig, op. cit. supra note 92 at 470.
157. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2010:560, para 3.
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principles, including proportionality and principles of democratic
governance, such as consistent consultation with civil society. As the Supreme
Court confirmed (and the parties had already agreed) in Miller, the UK
referendum on withdrawal was consultative in nature.158 The vote of a subset
of the UK public to leave the EU, and therefore to alienate itself from EU
citizenship, is not sufficient to undo the requirement of parliamentary
approval. Under UK law, only Parliament – not government or the people
voting by referendum – can remove rights that individuals currently hold.159 In
turn, meaningful respect for EU citizenship further highlights the need for the
UK Parliament – the only body constitutionally empowered with divesting
UK nationals of their EU rights – to be able to vote on the agreement once the
reduction in the level of protection of the rights of UK citizens has become
known, rather than assuming that it has done so in advance by authorizing the
government to notify.160
If the Parliament does not have a final say on the matter, then under Article
50(1) and the aforementioned case law, the removal of EU citizenship that
may follow from withdrawal will be reviewable by the ECJ, should it be asked
to assess the terms and process of the agreement in an Opinion.
4.3.3. Approval of the withdrawal agreement
The final question that a constitutionalist reading of Article 50 must address
is what happens once an agreement is reached. What is the role of parliaments
in approving that agreement (both at the national and at the EU level)? At first
glance, Article 50(3) offers easy enough answers to the questions of when
withdrawal shall occur if an agreement is reached, signed, and ratified, as well
as if no agreement is reached at all: “The Treaties shall cease to apply to the
State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement
or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2,
unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned,
unanimously decides to extend this period.” But does that mean that, if the UK
Parliament comes back with amendments, all of this needs to take place within
the two-year time-frame? And what if the European Parliament refuses its
consent, and asks for re-negotiation?
When assessed from a constitutionalist viewpoint, and considered in light
of the discussions and concerns voiced during its drafting, it is clear that
Article 50 was intended to privilege the reaching of an agreement. The ticking
clock in the provision is preceded by a “failing that” which suggests that it is
158. Miller Supreme Court, para 171.
159. See JH Rayner (Mincing Lane Ltd) v. DTI [1990] 2 AC 418, 500.
160. See Phillipson, op. cit. supra note 96, 1073; Birkinshaw, “Brexit Editorial” 23 EPL
(2017), 1, at 8 et seq.
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a fall-back option. The introduction of a timeframe was intended to act as a
safeguard for both sides: it ensures that the withdrawing State does not stall the
negotiations to gain time and, secondly, that the withdrawing State can still, if
it so wishes, leave the Union even if no agreement is reached. However, neither
of these concerns bite once an agreement has been negotiated and is put before
the national and EU parliaments, and the provision itself does not clearly
stipulate what should happen in case the agreement duly negotiated within the
two-year timeframe is not consented to. In our view, in such a case, the priority
must be the reaching of a solid agreement that addresses key constitutional
issues and enjoys the requisite support from the institutions involved in the
process, and not a mere falling back on the “no-deal” approach.
This reading of Article 50 does not conflict with its terms. Indeed, “failing
that” can be read as referring to the complete failure to negotiate (and thus
conclude) a withdrawal agreement in the first place. Where there is an
agreement, and either the national or EU parliament demands further
negotiation, the two-year period ought to be regarded as suspended until the
agreement is concluded and enters into force. It is only in case of a complete
breakdown in the negotiations that exit without a withdrawal agreement
ensues. As noted above, the reason the two-year timeframe was inserted into
Article 50 was to clarify that the withdrawing State is under no obligation of
further association with the Union, as well as to ensure that neither party is
able to stall the negotiations. But it cannot be read as entailing the brushing
aside of any effective parliamentary scrutiny once an agreement is found, or be
used as a means of compelling the legislature to accept whatever agreement is
put on the table. To read Article 50 in a way that requires the UK Parliament
and the European Parliament to approve it within the two-year period would
have this effect. Neither of these parliamentary bodies would have an interest
in rejecting the agreement outright at that point: if they did, they would be
putting their citizens in a highly prejudicial transitional period with no
agreement at all. But if they also had no opportunity of proposing amendments
to such an agreement because that could result in the agreement not being
approved on time, their role in the process would become merely
accessorial.161
The “argument from democracy”, as Phillipson calls it, is particularly
strong when the need for meaningful parliamentary approval is considered in
the context of the UK constitution: the limitation of the will of the Crown by
the UK Parliament is in the UK’s very constitutional history.162 It may be that
Article 50(3) provides for a two-year clock, but in constitutional moments of
161. See Edward at al., op. cit. supra note 80, paras. 22 et seq.
162. Phillipson, op. cit. supra note 96 at 1087; R v. Secretary of State for Home Department
ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513, 552, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
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this gravity, it is essential to read that provision with regard to the antecedent
requirement in Article 50(1). Furthermore, a constitutionalist reading of
Article 50 includes respect for democracy, a core EU value, and the role of
parliaments in the withdrawal process must therefore be taken seriously.
In turn, as far as the EU is concerned, it is not enough merely to affirm,
informally, that “representatives of the European Parliament will be invited”
to attend preparatory meetings in the withdrawal negotiations.163 Nor is it
enough to say, in general terms, that “the Union negotiator will be invited to
keep the European Parliament closely and regularly informed throughout the
negotiation”, that “the Presidency of the Council will be prepared to inform
and exchange views with the European Parliament before and after each
meeting of the General Affairs Council”, and that “the President of the
European Parliament will be invited to be heard at the beginning of meetings
of the European Council”.164 Ultimately, such statements suggest that the role
of the European Parliament in the process depends on the goodwill of the
Union negotiator. In itself, that does not contravene the explicit terms of
Article 50. But if, then, the only formal, institutional role that is envisaged for
the European Parliament in Article 50 is its possibility to veto the agreement,
that power could not be exercised freely, absent a suspensive effect.
Indeed, it must be emphasized that withdrawal is a special case, from a
constitutional vantage point: there is no parallelism between this process and
other agreements in which the Parliament might exercise its veto power after
informal consultations in similar fashion, for the result of leaving without any
agreement at all on this occasion could have far greater consequences for a
significant number of EU citizens directly affected by the agreement detailing
the future relationship. Moreover, an exit from the EU without a withdrawal
agreement changes the law in the most fundamental of ways: the Treaties
simply no longer apply. By contrast, a refusal by the European Parliament to
give its consent to any other agreement which requires this (see Art. 218(6)
TFEU), does not change the law. No new international commitments are
entered into in the absence of such consent.
For the same reasons, we also consider that the withdrawal agreement may
itself regulate the date at which the UK leaves the EU, and could therefore
provide for a transition beyond the two-year period. Moreover, if the ECJ were
to be asked for its opinion on the compatibility of the withdrawal agreement
with the Treaties (Art. 218(11) TFEU), respect for the rule of law would
require that the withdrawal process is suspended, again if necessary beyond
the two-year period.
163. Statement after the informal meeting of the 27 Heads of State or Government, 15 Dec.
2016, para 6.
164. Ibid., para 7 (emphasis added).
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5. Conclusion
The constitutional questions at stake in the process of withdrawing from the
EU are of the utmost importance for the Union’s construction. As we have
sought to demonstrate, it is essential to read Article 50 from a constitutionalist
viewpoint: its context is one of constitutionalization and its implications will
mark national constitutions and the post-national constitutional structure of
the EU at the most basic level, irrespective of whether one considers it a
radically pluralist, unifying federal, or more mildly integrationist one. Article
50 raises important constitutional concerns not only for the withdrawing State
– an issue that thrives in the UK blogosphere – but also from the perspective of
the EU and its identity as a new legal order that creates rights and duties for
individuals, and safeguards them through accountable institutions, rather than
being merely an international treaty signed by States.
It must be added that the current political discourse on withdrawal,
particularly in the UK, stands in stark contrast with a constitutionalist
approach to Article 50. The process is spoken of in purely intergovernmental
terms, with the overriding aim of reaching the “best deal for Britain”,
particularly in respect of economic implications.165 Such a discourse
completely disregards the fact that Brexit involves this seismic shock to
individual rights – a shock whose severity depends on the outcome of the
Article 50 process. That process, in turn, is by definition concerned not with
the best deal for Britain, but with respect for the EU constitutional order – an
order that, up until withdrawal, still includes the UK. Similarly, while on the
EU side politics has taken charge in the aftermath of the referendum, that is
happening mainly in the intergovernmental structure of the European Council
rather than following the constitutional processes and ideals of integration that
characterized the drafting context of Article 50. The position of prominent EU
figures has occasionally been one of efficiency and expedience, even if it
results in a “hard Brexit”.166 Yet, how hard Brexit can be does not just depend
on political power in the negotiations and a drive to maintain the Union’s
stability, but also on the legal constraints resulting from the EU Treaties and
case law, as analysed above.
165. See e.g. James and Jones, “Getting best Brexit deal for banks ‘absolute priority’ – UK
minister”, Reuters, 11 Oct. 2016, <www.uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-banks-idUK
KCN12B0VM> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016).
166. Chassany, “Juncker tells EU leaders to be ‘intransigent’ with Britain”, Financial
Times, 7 Oct. 2016, <www.ft.com/content/1ba02b24-8c8a-11e6-8cb7-e7ada1d123b1> (last
visited 11 Dec. 2016); “‘Hard Brexit’’ or ‘no Brexit’ for Britain – Tusk”, BBC News, 13 Oct.
2016, <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37650077> (last visited 11 Dec. 2016).
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A constitutionalist reading of Article 50 thus brings into sharper relief the
fact that the withdrawal process cannot be one that is entirely at the mercy of
politics. It is governed by specific constitutional constraints on the EU side as
well. Ultimately, what makes a constitutionalist rather than a purely
intergovernmental approach to Article 50 most appealing is that the
constitutional orders of the UK and the EU converge on many of the most
crucial constitutional issues. Legislation not only in the EU but also in the UK
protects against the use of nationality as a discriminatory premise.167
Furthermore, UK courts have so far been deeply mindful of the need to respect
acquired rights and legal certainty.168
It would be flawed to assume that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU can be
carried out in the absence of consideration of the constitutional dimensions of
the EU, except only partially and temporarily. After all, the constitutional
order of the EU stems from the common traditions of its Member States: it is
neither autonomous nor created in a contextual vacuum. It is premised on
respect for national constitutions, fundamental rights, and democratic values.
It is indeed the product of years of integration between the ECHR, the
constitutions of the Member States and the goals that these have over time
entrusted the EU with safeguarding.169 Our suggestions are therefore far from
revolutionary. They entail, rather, respect for basic and highly convergent
constitutional structures that have underpinned the relationship between the
UK and the EU so far.They can be subsumed under the rubric of the rule of law
and commitment to the democratic process. Failure to respect them at any
point during the withdrawal process raises serious concerns for both EU and
UK constitutional law.
167. Equality Act 2010, s9(1)b. This provision includes “nationality” in the definition of
race, a protected characteristic under s4 of this Act.
168. See supra note 146.
169. Eeckhout, “Human rights and the autonomy of EU Law: Pluralism or integration?”, 66
Current Legal Problems (2013), 171-172.
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